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There are many limitations when using file hashes to 
identify known content. Because changing just a single 
bit of a file changes its hash, pornographers, malware au-
thors, and other miscreants can evade detection simply by 
changing a comma to a period or appending a few random 
bytes to a file. Likewise, hash-based identification will not 
work if sections of the file are damaged or otherwise un-
recoverable. This is especially a problem when large video 
files are deleted and the operating system reuses a few 
sectors for other purposes: most of the video is still present 
on the drive, but recovered video segments will not appear 
in a database of file hashes.
SECTOR HASHING
We are developing alternative systems for detecting 
target files in large disk images using cryptographic hashes 
on sectors of data rather than entire files. Modern file sys-
tems align the start of most files with the beginning of a 
disk sector. Thus, when a megabyte-sized video is stored on 
a modern hard drive, the first 4 kibibytes are stored in one 
disk sector, the second 4 KiBytes are stored in another disk 
sector, typically the adjacent one, and so on. (In our work, 
we distinguish between power-of-two-based sizes of digital 
artifacts, such as kibibytes, and power-of-ten-based sizes, 
such as kilobytes. See the “Decimal versus Binary Prefixes” 
sidebar for more details.) Furthermore, by sampling ran-
domly chosen sectors from the drive, it is only necessary 
to read a tiny fraction of the drive to determine with high 
probability if a target file is present. This enables rapid triage 
of drive images.  
We compare drive sector hashes to a hash database of 
fixed-sized file fragments, which we call blocks. The terms 
“sector” and “block” are often used incorrectly as syn-
F orensic examiners frequently search disk drives, cell phones, and even network flows to determine if specific known content is present. For example, a corporate security officer might examine a sus-
picious employee’s laptop for unauthorized documents; 
law enforcement officers might search a suspect’s home 
computer for illegal pornography; and network analysts 
might reconstruct Transmission Control Protocol streams 
to determine if malware was downloaded. In these and 
many other cases, examiners typically identify files by 
computing their cryptographic hash—often with MD5 or 
SHA1 hash algorithms—and then searching a database for 
the resulting hash value. 
Use of hash values for file identification is pervasive 
in digital forensics—every popular forensics pack-
age has built-in support. One of the most widely used 
databases is the National Software Reference Library 
(NSRL) Reference Data Set (RDS). Version 2.36, released 
in March 2012, contains 25,892,924 distinct file hashes 
(www.nsrl.nist.gov). Other databases are available to 
customers of specific companies and to law enforcement 
organizations.
Using an alternative approach to traditional 
file hashing, digital forensic investigators 
can hash individually sampled subject 
drives on sector boundaries and then 
check these hashes against a prebuilt da-
tabase, making it possible to process raw 
media without reference to the underlying 
file system. 
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onyms. For clarity, we use “sector” and “block” to refer to 
chunks of data extracted from drive images and files or file 
systems, respectively. Our approach depends on the exis-
tence of file blocks that only occur in a single distinct file. 
Experiments show that such distinct blocks comprise the 
vast majority of both executable files and user-generated 
content. Matches against block hashes shown not to occur 
elsewhere are strong evidence that a corresponding target 
file is or was present.
As the “Previous Work” sidebar describes, little 
work has been done on the use of sector hashes for 
file identification. However, sector hashing has numer-
ous advantages over file hashing in forensic analysis. 
In many cases, using sector hashing with full media 
analysis—comparing every sector of the drive to an 
appropriate database—can detect a single block from a 
file that was once present. Alternatively, sector hashing 
can be combined with random sampling, making it pos-
sible to scan a terabyte-sized drive for the presence of 
select data in just a few minutes.
While sector hashing offers advantages when used for 
file detection in a forensic context, it also presents techni-
cal difficulties. 
BLOCK SIZE AND HASH ALGORITHM
Two important design choices for using sector hashes 
are the block size and the hash algorithm. 
Clearly, the block size must be small enough so that 
file blocks will align with drive sectors. The easiest way 
to assure this is to use a block size of 512 bytes, the sector 
size of most mass storage systems from the 1970s until 
quite recently. When presented with a device that has a 
larger sector size—for example, 2 KiBytes in CD-ROMs or 
4 KiBytes in modern drives—the sectors could be divided 
into 512-byte blocks and hashed accordingly.
However, 512 bytes might be smaller than necessary. 
Many file systems use a 4-KiByte allocation size (NTFS has 
a default cluster size of 4 KiBytes for drives smaller than 
16 Tbytes). In addition, using a 4-KiByte block size would 
reduce the hash value database’s size by a factor of eight. 
The danger with a 4-KiByte block size is that a file system 
with a 4-KiByte allocation size might be used to write to a 
device with 512-byte sectors. If the blocks are not aligned 
on an eight-sector boundary, there is a risk that each set 
of eight sectors hashed would contain part of one block 
and part of another. The result is that no distinct blocks 
would be found.
This problem can be avoided in devices with 512-byte 
sectors by reading 15 sectors at a time, producing eight 
hashes: the first from sectors 0-7, the second from sectors 
1-8, and so on. While multiple hashing does increase the 
computational costs of both hashing and database opera-
tions, the need for such hashing will decrease over time as 
512-byte-sector devices are phased out of use. 
We chose the MD5 hash algorithm, which is widely used 
within the forensic community and computationally fast. 
Although MD5 is no longer collision resistant, our tech-
nique relies on using hashes to match adversary data to 
target content—in fact, collisions actually facilitate the 
process.
Decimal versus Binary prefixes
t oday there are two standards for representing sizes of files, storage systems, and memory banks: SI (International System of 
Units) decimal prefixes and IEC (International Electro-technical 
Commission) binary prefixes. SI decimal prefixes are commonly used 
to represent metric quantities. For example, the SI prefix giga- 
multiplies the value that follows by 109; thus, a gigabyte (Gbyte) is 
109 = 1,000,000,000 bytes. In contrast, the IEC prefix gibi- multiplies 
the value that follows by 230; a gibibyte (GiByte) is thus 230 = 
1,073,741,824 bytes. 
The confusion over prefixes dates back to the early days of com-
puting, when K and M meant 1,024 and 1,048,576 when describing 
memory systems but 1,000 and 1,000,000 when describing storage 
systems. The difference in terminology resulted from the way that 
these systems were addressed. Memory was addressed by a series of 
binary lines, while electromechanical drums and disks were addressed 
by specifying a head, a track, and sector numbers: such numbers only 
map to even powers of two when the number of heads, tracks, and 
sectors are also even powers of two, and this is rarely the case due to 
manufacturing concerns.
For much of computing history, the fact that 1K sometimes meant 
1,000 and sometimes 1,024 was not a major problem, as the correct 
size could be inferred from context and, in any event, the difference 
between 1,000 and 1,024 is not that great. However, the distinction 
became an issue in the 1990s as memory capacity mushroomed and 
commonly used prefixes went from Ks to Ms and then Gs, resulting in 
a larger divergence between the power-of-two measurement and the 
corresponding power-of-ten measurement. The IEC accordingly pro-
posed binary prefixes in 1996 and standardized their use in 1999. In 
2008, the International Organization for Standardization adopted the 
IEC standard with the addition of prefixes for describing exbi- (260), 
zebi- (270), and yobi- (280) byte quantities.
Despite this standardization effort, we live in a world in which 
4-Gbyte memory sticks sold as system RAM can store 4,294,967,296 
bytes of data but 4-Gbyte microSD (Secure Digital) cards for cell 
phones are only warranted to store 4,000,000,000 bytes of data. How-
ever, since those 4 billion bytes are organized in 512-byte logical 
sectors, the microSD card typically stores 7,812,500 (or more) sectors, 
a number that does not make much sense technically but makes a 
great deal of sense when the design of flash-based storage systems is 
considered. That is, flash systems contain more physical memory than 
they advertise, with the system removing bad blocks from service as 
the device ages. Thus, a “4-Gbyte” microSD card might actually have 
8 million or even 9 million physical sectors, but those extra physical 
sectors are invisible to the operating system.
We expect use of IEC binary prefixes to increase with time. We use 
them here to describe block size and sector size, as they are typically 
multiples of 512 (29). We use SI decimal prefixes to describe disk sizes, 




Identifying files with sector hashes relies on the pres-
ence of distinct file blocks. A distinct block is one that does 
not occur anywhere more than once except as a block in a 
copy of the original file. Using distinct blocks as a forensic 
tool leverages two hypotheses: 
 • if a block of data from a file is distinct, then a copy of 
that block found on a data storage device is evidence 
that the file is or was once present; and 
 • if the blocks of that file are shown to be distinct with 
respect to a large and representative corpus, then 
those blocks can be treated as if they are universally 
distinct.1 
The first hypothesis is trivially true if we could know 
that a particular block is indeed distinct. Unfortunately, 
it is impossible to know this. On the other hand, we can 
determine the frequency of blocks in large collections of 
real files. 
The frequency of distinct blocks
We counted the number of blocks in several million-file 
corpora that occurred once, twice, or more frequently. 
We call these singleton, paired, and common blocks, re-
spectively. If paired and common blocks are extremely 
unusual, then it is reasonable to believe that singleton 
blocks are indeed universally distinct. Also, by examin-
ing the context of paired and common blocks, we might 
understand the root causes of their nondistinctness: a 
common method used to generate the data, an extrinsic 
process that created similar files, or some other kind of 
data-sharing mechanism. 
For these experiments, we used three corpora modified 
to remove all duplicate files: 
 • Govdocs, a collection of 974,741 freely redistributable 
files downloaded from US government webservers 
(average file size: 493 KiBytes);2 
 • OpenMalware 2012, a collection of 2,998,898 malware 
samples (average file size: 417 KiBytes);3 and
 • the 2009 NSRL RDS, a set of 12,236,979 block hashes 
for a collection of known, traceable software applica-
tions (average file size: 235 KiBytes).
To our knowledge, no previous studies have analyzed 
the co-occurrence of blocks across such a large number of 
files and file types. Using these corpora let us make some 
general conclusions about the frequency of distinct blocks.
We analyzed each corpus using both 512-byte and 
4-KiByte blocks—the sector size of older and modern 
hard drives, respectively—except in the case of the 2009 
NSRL RDS, for which 512-byte block hashes were not yet 
available. We also compared OpenMalware 2012 to the 
2009 NSRL RDS to find the most common blocks across 
legitimate and malicious executables. Table 1 lists the in-
cidence of singletons, pairs, and common sectors in the 
three corpora.
The vast majority of blocks in the corpora correspond 
to single, specific files. This is not surprising given that 
high entropy data approximates a random function. A 
truly random 512-byte block contains 4,096 bits of en-
tropy. There are thus 24,096 ≈ 101,200 possible different blocks, 
and all are equally probable. It is inconceivable that two 
previous WorK
W hile at the US Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center, Nick Harbour developed the dcfldd disk imaging tool (http://
dcfldd.sourceforge.net), based on GNU dd, that would compute a 
hash on a disk image as it was created. Harbour subsequently 
modified dcfldd to compute hashes over segments of the disk image 
so that if it was inadvertently modified, a chain of custody could be 
maintained for at least part of the image. He called this piecewise 
hashing. Jesse Kornblum’s md5deep (http://md5deep.sourceforge.
net) extended piecewise hashing to multiple files. 
As part of his solution to the 2006 Digital Forensics Research 
Workshop (DFRWS) Data Carving Challenge, Simson Garfinkel intro-
duced a new technique dubbed “the MD5 trick.”1 After finding the 
original challenge documents based on text fragments from the 
challenge description, Garfinkel computed the MD5 hash of 512-
byte file blocks and searched the challenge drive for matching 
512-byte sectors. Using this technique, he identified all of the chal-
lenge files including a fragmented Microsoft Word file. 
Three years later, Naval Postgraduate School researchers 
released frag_find, a tool that automates this process.2 Sylvain Col-
lange and colleagues called this approach hash-based data carving3 
and explored the use of GPUs to speed the hashing load. They found 
that, with a powerful enough GPU, it is possible to simultaneously 
hash a block of data on subsector boundaries—for example, 1,024 
bytes of data can be hashed in 512-byte chunks on 4-byte boundar-
ies, creating 128 distinct hash values—although doing so dramatic- 
ally increases pressure on the database.
In 2009, Simon Key developed the File Block Hash Map Analysis 
(FBHMA) EnScript, a dual-purpose tool that creates a hash map of file 
blocks from a master file list and searches selected areas of a target 
drive for the blocks.4 Like frag_find, however, FBHMA EnScript does 
not support billion-block hash databases or sufficiently fast lookup 
speeds to use sector hashing in full media analysis or random 
sampling.
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randomly generated blocks would have the same 
content. The randomness of user-generated content 
is less than 8 bits per byte, of course, but even for 
content that has entropy of 2 bits per byte, a 512-
byte block still contains 1,024 bits of entropy, again 
making it very unlikely that two blocks will be the 
same.
As Table 1 shows, all kinds of user-generated con-
tent, including word processing files, photos, and 
video, contain sectors that are not seen elsewhere—
that is, distinct blocks according to our definition. 
The frequency of distinct blocks in the OpenMalware 
2012 and 2009 NSRL RDS datasets is significantly 
lower but still quite high. However, our experiments 
make it clear that it is impossible to assume a priori 
that a given singleton block is distinct.
Origin of nondistinct blocks 
To better understand the root causes of nondistinct 
blocks, we analyzed the most common blocks from each 
corpus. Our original intuition was that blocks that had low 
entropy or that contained repeating byte patterns would 
occur frequently. We found that many of the common 
blocks indeed had these characteristics.
As expected, the block of all NUL (0×00) bytes was 
the most common block across all corpora. But we found 
other examples as well. For instance, there were more than 
200,000 occurrences of an Adobe PDF internal data struc-
ture in the Govdocs corpus. Likewise, we found several 
common blocks that contained Microsoft Office internal 
structures.
Several high-entropy blocks were common in the 
OpenMalware 2012 dataset. We found that these blocks 
occurred in different files but always at the same byte 
offset. Further analysis revealed that the containing files 
were actually different variants of the same malware, as 
reported by several antivirus tools on VirusTotal.com. The 
repeated blocks did not appear in any legitimate files listed 
in the 2009 NSRL RDS corpus. Clearly, these blocks are 
unique to a specific malware family and not general ex-
ecutables or other system files.
Although traditional file identification techniques re-
quire each variant’s hash, our findings show that shared 
blocks can identify some malware variants. We suspect 
that these common malware blocks are the result of hand-
patching existing malware and code reuse, or elementary 
attempts to change a file hash by adding bytes to the end 
of the file. 
BLOCK HASH DATABASE
To develop a useful system for performing sector analy-
sis, it is not enough to choose which or what size blocks 
should be used to capture a target dataset. It is necessary 
to, first, efficiently store the hashes for the target blocks 
and, second, check quickly enough to determine whether 
disk sectors are present in the dataset.
Performance requirements 
Our goal is to create a database of one billion file block 
hashes that can be field deployed on a laptop. The data-
base should be fast enough to support searches of hashes 
that are created by reading a consumer hard drive at the 
maximum I/O transfer rate (assuming that hashing is free). 
Given that it takes approximately 200 minutes to read the 
contents of a Tbyte-size hard drive, this translates to a 
database that can perform roughly 150,000 hash lookups 
per second. With a billion 512-byte block hashes, the data-
base would allow identification of 512 gigabytes of known 
content, a number that is sufficient for many applications. 
Because hash values are evenly distributed, the database 
can be trivially parallelized using prefix routing.4 A cluster 
with 1,000 such databases could thus support 1012 block 
hashes and address half a petabyte of known content.
Instead of hashing every sector of the drive, it is possible 
to conduct an exhaustive investigation sampling only one 
million randomly chosen sectors. Although the sample con-
tains only 0.05 percent of the drive, there is a 98.17 percent 
chance of detecting 4 Mbytes of known content, provided 
that each of those 8,000 blocks is in the database. 
This is an instance of the well-known “urn problem” in 
statistics, which describes the probability of pulling some 
number of red beans out of an urn that contains a mix of 
randomly distributed red and black beans. In this case, the 
red beans are distinct sectors, there are 8,000 (C) of them 
distributed randomly, there are two billion beans in total 
(N), and one million (n) are selected randomly. The prob-
ability p of not finding even a single red bean in n draws is
 
p =1 − 
N  − (i  − 1)( ) − C( )
N  − (i  − 1)( )
i   −  1
n
∏ .
Applying this equation to 500,000 and 250,000 randomly 
selected sectors, we find that the chance of detecting 
table 1. incidence of singleton, paired, and common sectors  
in three file corpora. 
No. of blocks Govdocs OpenMalware 2012 2009 NSRL RDS
Block size: 512 bytes
Singleton 911.4 M   (98.93%) 1,063.1 M   (88.69%) N/A
Pair      7.1 M        (.77%)       75.5 M     (6.30%) N/A
Common     2.7 M        (.29%)       60.0 M     (5.01%) N/A
Block size: 4 kibibytes
Singleton  117.2 M   (99.46%)     143.8 M   (89.51%) 567.0 M   (96.00%)
Pair     0.5 M        (.44%)          9.3 M     (5.79%)   16.4 M      (2.79%)
Common     0.1 M        (.11%)          7.6 M     (4.71%)      7.1 M      (1.21%)
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4 Mbytes of known content, provided each of the 8,000 
blocks is in the database, is 86.47 percent and 63.21 per-
cent, respectively.
Note that the 4 Mbytes might be a single high-resolution 
JPEG or 40 medium-resolution JPEGs—the key issue is that 
there are 8,000 distinct blocks stored on sectors of the 
drive, and each random choice represents another chance 
to find one of them. Furthermore, because each sample 
is random, the distribution of the sectors on the drive is 
irrelevant—the chance of finding them with a random 
search is the same whether they are randomly distributed 
or clustered in a single location.
A 7,200-rpm hard drive can perform approximately 300 
seeks per second. If the million randomly chosen sectors 
are sorted in advance, most systems could read all of them 
in 30 minutes; it is possible to read more data in the same 
time by increasing the read size to 8, 64, or even 128 sec-
tors, although the statistical calculation becomes more 
complicated because many of the samples are now corre-
lated, not strictly random. Thus, for the random sampling 
application, a database lookup of a few thousand transac-
tions per second might be sufficient.
Designing the database
Neither conventional SQL databases such as MySQL, 
PostgreSQL, and SQLite nor NoSQL databases such as 
MongoDB have sufficient performance to support even 
high-speed random sampling. Using recent versions of 
each database on a Dell R510 server equipped with Dual 
Xeon E5620 2.4-GHz processors (each with 16 cores, a 
12-mibibite cache, and 128-gibibite main memory), we got 
less than 1,000 lookups per second for databases contain-
ing one billion hashes. 
To achieve better performance, we created our own 
purpose-built key-value pair store, where the key is a cryp-
tographic block hash and the value identifies the source file 
and offset. We tested various custom-built solutions using 
hash maps, B-trees, red/black trees, and sorted vectors. In 
keeping with our goal for field deployment, the database 
is precomputed, finalized, and distributed to the client as 
a single file.
When looking for known content, we expect few of the 
sector hashes from a subject drive to actually be present 
in the database. We leverage this by checking a Bloom 
filter5 before checking the database. Bloom filters facilitate 
efficient probabilistic set-membership checking with a zero 
false-negative rate and a false-positive rate dependent on 
the filter’s parameters—the number of bits used in each 
hash (M) and the number of hash functions used (k). 
When storing an item in the Bloom filter, we first hash 
the item k times, yielding k M-bit integers. We then set the 
corresponding bits in the filter. To test membership, we 
repeat the process, but instead of setting the bits, we check 
them, and if one or more bits are not set, the item cannot 
be in the filter. Note, however, that if all k bits are set, the 
item might or might not be present, as the bits might be 
aliases set for other items. 
As we are storing the 128-bit MD5 hash values for 
the block, we do not need to compute k new hashes, but 
instead can partition the MD5 hash into M bit chunks. 
The resulting Bloom filter consumes 2M bits or 2M/8 = 
2M–3 bytes. When M = 32, for example, the result is only 
k = 128/32 = 4 hashes, and the Bloom filter occupies 
512 MiBytes of disk space. The theoretical false-positive 
rate of such a filter with a billion items is 13.48 percent, 
approximated by Pfp = (1 – e
–kn/m)k. Doubling the size of the 
filter lowers the false-positive rate to 1.92 percent.6
One typically implements red/black trees, flat maps 
(essentially sorted vectors), and hash maps as in-memory 
data structures. To achieve persistence, we developed a 
data structure based on the boost::interprocess library, 
which allows transparently placing Boost C++ container 
implementations into memory-mapped files. For the 
B-tree back end, we selected Beman Dawes’ proposed 
boost::btree library (https://github.com/Beman/Boost-
Btree) and adapted our framework to support this back 
end. We used the Naval Postgraduate School’s Bloom filter 
implementation. 
After the user finalizes the database, the framework 
packs the data structures and releases extra space. In ad-
dition, it rewrites the B-tree with fully packed nodes at 
maximum density, enabling it to preload part of the tree 
into RAM. 
Finally, the framework supports sharding the database 
into multiple chunks by the high-order bits in the key type.
Our key type is the 128-bit MD5 hash, and the record 
type is 64 bits partitioned to represent a file identifier and 
an offset yielding a 24-byte-per-record minimum cost. The 
flat map and B-tree back ends are most efficient, using less 
than 25 bytes per element, while the red/black tree and 
hash maps are less efficient, using 64 and 61 bytes per 
element, respectively. The red/black tree overhead comes 
from the tree nodes, while the hash map overhead results 
from unused buckets.
As cryptographic hashes are designed to be unpredict-
able, there is no similarity from one hash to the next, thus 
there is little locality of reference that the operating system 
can exploit when building the database. System RAM thus 
becomes the dominant factor in determining the time re-
quired. On one Intel Xeon E5620-based server (2.4 GHz, 
12-MiByte L2 cache) with 32 GiBytes of RAM, it took 29 
Our goal is to create a database of one 
billion file block hashes that can be  
field deployed on a laptop. 
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days to create a billion-record hash map, while it took less 
than four hours on a slower, AMD Opteron 6174-based 
system (2.2 GHz, 512-KiByte L2 cache) with 256 GiBytes 
of RAM. 
We found that creating some locality by first building 
the database as a flat map and then converting to either a 
B-tree or hash map was faster than generating the B-tree 
or hash map directly. Likewise, we found that tuning 
the Linux operating system parameters dirty_ratio, 
dirty_background_ratio, and dirty_expire_centisecs 
to allow dirty pages to stay in memory longer improved 
performance by helping the OS use the disk cache more 
efficiently. 
When fielding systems using the block hash database, 
system memory and I/O speed are the prime drivers. A 
drive triage system must be able to read disk sectors as fast 
as possible from a subject drive and test hashes of those 
sectors against the database. Large RAM allows caching 
more of the database, reducing I/O pressure. The database 
should be stored on a solid state drive (SSD) to further 
speed I/O, since every lookup will require one or more 
random seeks within the database file. 
For systems supporting fixed sites, such as a customs 
and immigration checkpoint, a large memory server or 
cluster can maintain the entire database in RAM and sup-
port several triage stations over a gigabit network.
Back-end testing
We performed back-end testing with databases contain-
ing 100 million and 1 billion records. The tests were done 
on a laptop with 8 GiBytes of RAM, a 2.67-GHz processor, 
and a 250-Gbyte SSD attached via eSATA and USB2 drives. 
We performed additional testing on a desktop system with 
24 GiBytes of RAM and spinning media. All runs were per-
formed with 50/50 random blends of database hits and 
misses, which might be unrealistically pessimistic. To 
guarantee that no part of the database was already loaded 
in memory, we directed the OS to stop caching all disk files 
by syncing the disks and then writing a “3” into /proc/sys/
vm/drop_caches between each run.
Table 2 shows the read transactions per second against 
the 100 million and one billion record databases after one 
million lookups (2-384 seconds, depending on the row) and 
at 1,200 seconds, obtained with the four back-end strate-
gies and B-tree with and without preload. Performance 
graphs for all of the runs are available at http://domex.
nps.edu/deep.
The hash map offered the best performance at 100 mil-
lion records, followed in order by the red/black tree, the flat 
map, and the B-trees. There was a factor-of-eight difference 
for queries that were present, but only a 40 percent spread 
for queries that were not present. In all cases, we observed 
that database misses were dramatically faster than hits, a 
result of prefiltering with the Bloom filter. The back-end 
performance is still relevant for misses, however, due to 
the false positives. We also observed that very large Bloom 
filters negatively impacted speed because of increased 
memory pressure. At one billion records, we obtained the 
best performance with M = 33 for the no-preload B-tree. 
Note that while the hash map outperformed the other strat-
egies at 100 million records, B-trees overall dominated all 
other strategies by a factor of almost 30 (300 times better 
than the classic databases). The USB2 drive was roughly 
half the speed of the eSATA drive.
In sum, for billion-record hash databases, the B-tree 
is the best choice. For smaller datasets, the hash map 
table 2. total transactions per second (tps) for best execution. 
Bloom filter Database TPS at 1 M lookups TPS at 1,200 seconds
k M Size Strategy Size Present Absent Present Absent
100 million records
3 31 257 MiBytes B-tree (preload) 2.3 GiBytes 35.3 K 49.5 K 161.3 K 1.8 M
3 31 257 MiBytes B-tree 2.3 GiBytes 11.6 K 565.8 K 156.8 K 2.3 M
3 31 257 MiBytes Hash map 5.3 GiBytes 13.9 K 656.9 K 641.9 K 3.0 M
3 31 257 MiBytes Flat map 2.2 GiBytes 28.2 K 746.9 K 356.4 K 2.6 M
3 31 257 MiBytes Red/black tree 6.0 GiBytes 12.9 K 694.5 K 187.0 K 2.7 M
1 billion records
3 34 2.1 GiBytes B-tree (preload) 23 GiBytes 2.2 K 6.1 K 3.6 K 23.1 K
3 33 1.1 GiBytes B-tree 23 GiBytes 2.6 K 85.8 K 3.7 K 114.9 K
3 33 1.1 GiBytes Hash map 57 GiBytes – – 0.3 K 3.1 K
3 34 2.1 GiBytes Flat map 22 GiBytes – – 0.4 K 4.0 K
3 33 1.1 GiBytes Red/black tree 60 GiBytes – – 0.1 K 1.4 K
Dashes indicate that 1 million queries were not completed in the 1,200 seconds allowed.
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is the fastest, but the flat map offers the best compro-
mise between space and time (being among the smallest 
and tied for second place in speed), while the B-tree 
offers the poorest (requiring the most space and being 
the slowest). In either case, database lookups can be 
performed faster than sectors can be read from a drive 
being triaged.
SECTOR HASHING IN DIFFERENT  
FILE SYSTEMS
An advantage of sector hashing is the ability to process 
raw media without reference to the underlying file system. 
Doing so requires aligning the file data on sector boundar-
ies. Fortunately, most file systems in use today align files in 
data units that consist of multiple disk sectors. These allo-
cation units are variously called clusters, blocks, or sectors. 
Current file systems
The FAT (File Allocation Table) file system, introduced 
by Microsoft with DOS, has become the de facto format for 
storage devices such as thumb drives, external hard disks, 
and Secure Digital (SD) cards. All three FAT variants (12, 
16, and 32) block-align data. 
Microsoft developed exFAT (extended FAT) to address 
FAT’s file size and performance limitations. It lacks the 
NTFS security features, but it can support file sizes greater 
than 4 GiBytes. Like its predecessors, exFat has a block-
aligned data region.
NTFS (New Technology File System) is the default file 
system for the current generation of Windows. It uses a 
master file table (MFT) that has an entry for every file 
and directory. NTFS block-aligns large files but not files 
smaller than 1,024 bytes, which can be contained entirely 
in the MFT. The advent of 4-KiByte physical sector drives 
raises an issue, as they are not supported by products 
prior to Windows 8 and Server 2012. Instead, NTFS uses 
an “emulation mode” 512e to return a logical sector. While 
emulation can occur transparently, it also can induce 
file system clusters to cross physical sector boundaries, 
causing every physical sector to contain parts of differ-
ent contiguous clusters. The techniques for working with 
512-byte physical sector sizes also address alignment 
problems.
Ext4 is the default file system for most Linux distri-
butions, including newer versions of Android. A major 
difference between Ext4 and Ext3 is that the former uses 
extents, while the latter employs a block pointer system. 
Despite this, Ext3 and Ext4 base their allocation on blocks, 
so file data is invariably aligned with the underlying stor-
age media. 
Next-generation file systems
Newer file systems handle data storage quite differ-
ently than their predecessors. Differences include data 
and metadata integrity mechanisms, copy-on-write 
transactions instead of journals, and built-in support for 
snapshots. However, sector hashing should work on these 
systems.
ZFS is the most mature next-generation file system, 
and the only one used in production environments. ZFS 
“blocks” are dynamically sized extents consisting of 
multiple sectors. If a file requires more space than the 
maximum block size, the system allocates multiple blocks. 
Since blocks are always aligned with the underlying stor-
age media, there is no impact on sector hashing.
The B-tree file system (Btrfs) is poised to become the 
file system of choice for Linux. Although Btrfs uses extents 
of blocks to store large files, it can pack small files into 
the leaf block of the B-tree used to store file attributes. 
Thus, the system might not sector-align files smaller than 
4 KiBytes. 
The Resilient File System (ReFS) is Microsoft’s upcoming 
innovation. Like Btrfs, ReFS makes extensive use of B-trees 
and extents. ReFS will block-align data, but whether it will 
pack small files into the B-trees is currently unknown.
Encrypted file systems
If an application such as Adobe Acrobat encrypts a file 
and transfers it to a different system, the encrypted data 
blocks will remain the same on the target media. Thus, 
sector hashing can aid in revealing the presence of en-
crypted files, provided they have not been re-encrypted. 
Encrypted file systems, in contrast, present a significant 
problem. BitLocker for NTFS and ReFS and FileVault 2 for 
Apple’s HFS+ encrypt data blocks as they are written to 
the storage medium and decrypt them when they are read 
back. Because each drive is encrypted with a different key, 
the same data will be encrypted differently on different 
drives. Thus, sector hashing will not work with these drives 
unless the block device is read through the file system 
after the decryption key has been loaded or the drive is 
otherwise decrypted.
Q uickly detecting documents or images of interest in digital media is critical to the forensic investigation process. Given a large disk or set of disks, an inves-
tigator requires an efficient triage process to determine 
if known bad or illegal files or previously unseen files 
that require additional analysis are present. Traditionally, 
forensic investigators use file-hashing tools to analyze the 
file system. However, file hashing has several shortcom-
Sector hashing can aid in revealing the 
presence of encrypted files, provided 
they have not been re-encrypted.
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ings: it does not work with files that have been modified 
in any way, it requires files to be intact, and it requires the 
ability to extract both allocated and deleted files from the 
subject media in a forensically sound manner.
Our approach for forensic identification of data searches 
disk sectors for distinct file blocks, rather than searching 
the file system for distinct files. Our method is agnostic to 
the file system and file type, and can analyze all portions 
of the media including unallocated space, metadata, and 
encrypted content. Sector hashing can also be parallelized 
since each sector is processed independently of all others.
Using sector hashes presents several challenges. 
The first is choosing an appropriate file block size that 
balances the ability to identify distinct chunks of files 
with the amount of data that needs to be stored and 
analyzed. A block hash database’s large size makes it 
necessary to design a custom data store for this ap-
plication. It is also useful to identify disk sectors that 
are likely to be nondistinct to minimize the number of 
queries made to the database without missing critical 
distinct file blocks. 
A potential critique of our approach is that an attacker 
could defeat it by adding or removing semantically empty 
data to files, thereby changing the sector alignment. In 
response, we note that it would be easier to encrypt the 
entire drive and that many people are still not doing this.
Although sector hashing will be a powerful tool for 
media forensics, the size of the block hash database will 
surely hamper widespread adoption. Consequently, sector 
hashing is more likely to appeal to large organizations 
searching for stray copies of their own files and new vari-
ants of malware that they have already encountered, 
rather than by small organizations seeking to match their 
media against a database distributed by a vendor or the 
US government. 
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